The impact on Ukraine`s foreign policy would be considerable. A neutrality clause in the Constitution would exclude NATO membership.56 But the DNR and NRL would be able to sign agreements with other countries (Russia) and perhaps establish Russian military bases on their territories.57 New doubts would also surround European integration. Acceptance of Russian requests could weaken the central authorities in Kiev to the point of making it impossible to implement the AA. Nine of the 13 points of the agreement concern conflict management: a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the contact line (Articles 1 to 3); an amnesty for combat participants (Article 5); the exchange of hostages and people unlawfully arrested (Article 6); Humanitarian aid (Article 7); the resumption of socio-economic relations between Ukraine and occupied Donbass (Article 8); the withdrawal from Ukraine of “all foreign armed formations, military equipment and also mercenaries” and the disarmament of “all illegal groups” (Article 10); and the activities of the TCG (Article 13). It is precisely because Minsk-2 reflects this impasse on the battlefield that it is a document by nature contradictory. As has already been said, the agreement subordinates the return of the border with Ukrainian control to a political settlement acceptable to Russia and its deputies. However, it also contains provisions that promote the restoration of Ukrainian control of the Donbass before an agreement is reached. Articles 1 and 2 provide for a permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the contact line before a dialogue on elections. Article 4 does not know whether the dialogue begins the day after the withdrawal begins or the day after the closing; Ukraine can credibly state that the withdrawal of heavy weapons must be completed before preparations begin. More importantly, Russia is withdrawing its troops, 63 Russia has strengthened the armed formations of the DNR/NRL and strengthened their control over them, so that they now attach themselves effectively to its own military.64 Together, these circumstances prevent the holding of elections in the Donbass in accordance with OSCE/BDIM standards, as stipulated in Article 12. With the 2015 Ukrainian municipal elections scheduled for 25 October, DPR leader Alexander Zakhartchenko adopted a decree on 2 July ordering the sending election on 18 October.  He stated that this measure was “in accordance with the Minsk agreements”.  According to Zakharchenko, this meant that the DPR had “started to implement the Minsk agreements independently”.
 Zakharchenko stated that the elections would be held “on the basis of The Ukrainian Law on the Status of Temporary Self-Domination of Certain Districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions”, as they were not in contradiction with the DPR Constitution and laws.  Russia was not ready. Sourkov coordinated the development of additional requirements (published on 13 May in the form of DNR/NRL proposals).